Oakeshott, Half-Formed Davidson

From near the start of ‘The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’:

There are, for example, theories that make freedom consist in decisions taken apart from all desires, habits, and dispositions of the agent; and theories of knowledge that suggest that the mind can observe the totality of its own perceptions and ideas.  In each case, the mind is divorced from the traits that constitute it; an inescapable conclusion from certain lines of reasoning, as I said, but one that should always persuade us to reject the premises.

Sounds like something that could come straight out of Rationalism in Politics, no?  This partly why, I think, Stephen Turner has suggested Oakeshott wasn’t a ‘neo-Kantian’ at all (Turner is — or at least was — a Davidson fan I believe).  On the other hand, it could just point towards a tension in Oakeshott’s ideas, those of Rationalism in Politics clashing with those in Experience and its Modes and On Human Conduct (this is Efraim Podoksik’s view).